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SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES IN CLOUD 
COMPUTING 
 
Abstract: 
Cloud computing transforming the way of information technology (IT) for consuming 
and managing, promising improving cost efficiencies, accelerate innovations, faster 
time-to-market and the ability to scale applications on demand (Leighton, 2009). 
According to Gartner, while the hype grew exponentially during 2008 and contin-
ued since, it is clear that there is a major shift towards the cloud computing model 
and that the benefits may be substantial (Gartner Hype-Cycle, 2012). However, as 
the shape of the cloud computing is emerging and developing rapidly both con-
ceptually and in reality, the legal/contractual, economic, service quality, interoper-
ability, security and privacy issues still pose significant challenges. In this chapter, 
we describe various service and deployment models of cloud computing and iden-
tify major challenges. In particular, we discuss three critical challenges: regulatory, 
security and privacy issues in cloud computing. Some solutions to mitigate these 
challenges are also proposed along with a brief presentation on the future trends in 
cloud computing deployment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to the Wikipedia “Cloud computing is a kind of Internet-based 
computing that provides shared processing resources and data to computers and 
other devices on demand”. As definition provided by the Badger et al., 2011 of 
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), “cloud computing is a mod-
el for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of config-
urable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management 
effort or service provider interaction”. It is representing a paradigm shift in in-
formation technology many of us are likely to see in our lifetime. While the cus-
tomers are so excited by the provided opportunities to reduce the capital costs, 
and the chance to divest themselves of infrastructure management and focus 
on core competencies, and above all the agility offered by the on-demand 
provisioning of computing, there are issues and challenges which need to be ad-
dressed before a ubiquitous adoption may happen. 
Cloud computing is referring both the applications delivered as services over 
the Internet and the hardware and systems software in the datacenters that pro-
vide those services. Cloud computing had four delivery models, as outlined 
by Badger et al., 2011 of NIST, based on who provides the cloud services. 
The business companies may employ one model or a combination of differ-
ent models for efficient and optimized delivery of applications and business ser-
vices. These four delivery models are:  
( i )  Private cloud environment (PCE) in which cloud services are provided 
solely for an organization and are managed by the organization or a third par-
ty. PCE services may exist off-site.  
(ii) Public cloud m a n a g e m e n t  e n v i r o n m e n t  ( P C M E ) .  I n  t h i s  m o d -
u l e  cloud services are available to the public and owned by an organization like 
Microsoft, Amazon, google etc. selling the cloud services.  
(iii) Community cloud (CC) model. As its name describe, that in which cloud ser-
vices are shared by several organizations for supporting a specific community that 
has shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance 
considerations). These services may be managed by the organizations or a third 
party and may exist off- site. A special case of community cloud is the Govern-
ment or G-Cloud. This type of cloud computing is provided by one or more 
agencies (service provider role), for use by all, or most, government agencies (user 
role). 
(iv) Hybrid Cloud Computing Model (HCC) is a composition of different cloud 
computing infrastructure (public, private or community). An example for hybrid 
cloud is the data stored in private cloud of a travel agency that is manipulated by a 
program running in the public cloud. 
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According NIST it has identified three basic types of cloud service of-
ferings.  These models are: 
I. Software as a service (SaaS) is used to offer renting application functionali-
ty from a service provider rather than buying, installing and running 
software by the user. 
II. Platform as a service (PaaS) is used to provide a platform in the cloud, 
upon which applications can be developed and executed. 
III. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) in which the vendors offer computing 
power and storage space on demand. 
Armbrust et al., 2009 according to hardware point of view, three aspects are 
new in the paradigm of cloud computing. These aspects of cloud computing are as 
follows:  
 The illusion of infinite computing resources available on demand, thereby 
eliminating the need for cloud computing users to plan far ahead for provisioning.  
 The elimination of an up-front commitment by cloud users, thereby allow-
ing companies to start small and increase hardware resources only when there is 
an increase in their needs. 
 The ability to pay for use of computing resources on a short-term basis as 
needed and release them when the resources are not needed, thereby rewarding 
conservation by letting machines and storage go when they are no longer useful. In a nut-
shell, cloud computing has enabled operations of large-scale data centers which 
has led to significant decrease in operational costs of those data centers. On the 
consumer side, there are some obvious benefits provided by cloud computing. 
The painful reality of running IT services is the fact that in most of the times, 
peak demand is significantly higher than the average demand.  
 
ARCHICTECTURE OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
In this section, we present a top-level architecture of cloud computing that 
depicts various cloud service delivery models. According to CSA Security Guid-
ance, 2009 “Cloud computing enhances collaboration, agility, scale, availability and 
provides the potential for cost reduction through optimized and efficient compu-
ting. More specifically, cloud describes the use of a collection of distributed ser-
vices, applications, information and infrastructure comprised of pools of compute, 
network, information and storage resources. These components can be rapidly 
arranged, provisioned, implemented and decommissioned using an on- demand 
utility-like model of allocation and consumption. Cloud services are most often 
utilized in conjunction with enabling virtualization technologies to provide dynam-
ic integration, provisioning, composition, mobility and scale. 
While the other definition of cloud is  suggesting the decoupling of re-
sources from the physical affinity to and location of the infrastructure that 
delivers them, many descriptions of cloud go to one extreme or another by 
either exaggerating or artificially limiting the many attributes of cloud. This is of-
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ten purposely done in an attempt to inflate or marginalize its scope. Some exam-
ples include the suggestions that for a service to be cloud-based, that the Internet 
must be used as a transport, a web browser must be used as an access modality 
or that the resources are always shared in a multi-tenant environment outside 
of the “perimeter.” What is missing in these definitions is context. 
From an architectural view is the abstracted evolution of technology, there is 
more confusion surrounding that how cloud of two companies are similar and 
different from existing models and how these similarities and differences might 
impact the organizational, operational and technological approaches to cloud 
adoption as it relates to traditional network and information security practices. 
There are those who say cloud is a novel sea-change and technical revolution 
while other suggests it is a natural evolution and coalescence of technology, econ-
omy and culture. The real truth is somewhere in between. 
According to CSA Security Guidance, 2009, Cloud services are based upon 
five principal characteristics that demonstrate their relation to, and differences 
from, traditional computing approaches. These characteristics are as follows:  
 Abstraction of infrastructure: As its name declared that the computa-
tion, network and storage infrastructure resources are abstracted from the applica-
tion and information resources as a function of service delivery. Where and by 
what physical resource that data is processed, transmitted and stored on becomes 
largely opaque from the perspective of an application or services’ ability to deliver 
it. Infrastructure resources are generally pooled in order to deliver service regard-
less of the tenancy model employed – shared or dedicated. This abstraction is 
generally provided by means of high levels of virtualization at the chipset and 
operating system levels or enabled at the higher levels by heavily customized file 
systems, operating systems or communication protocols. 
 Resource democratization: As its name declared that the abstraction 
of infrastructure yields the notion of resource democratization- whether infra-
structure, applications, or information – and provides the capability for pooled 
resources to be made available and accessible to anyone or anything authorized to 
utilize them using standardized methods for doing so. 
 Service-oriented architecture: As its name declared that as the abstrac-
tion of infrastructure from application and information yields well-defined and 
loosely-coupled resource democratization, the notion of utilizing these compo-
nents in whole or part, alone or with integration, provides a services oriented ar-
chitecture where resources may be accessed and utilized in a standard way. In this 
model, the focus is on the delivery of service and not the management of infra-
structure.  
 Elasticity/dynamism: As its name declared that the on-demand model 
of cloud provisioning coupled with high levels of automation, virtualization, and 
ubiquitous, reliable and high-speed connectivity provides for the capability to rap-
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idly expand or contract resource allocation to service definition and requirements 
using a self- service model that scales to as-needed capacity. Since resources are 
pooled, better utilization and service levels can be achieved. 
 Utility model of consumption and allocation: As its name declared 
that the abstracted, democratized, service-oriented and elastic nature of cloud 
combined with tight automation, orchestration, provisioning and self-service then 
allows for dynamic allocation of resources based on any number of governing 
input parameters. Given the visibility at an atomic level, the consumption of re-
sources can then be used to provide a metered utility- cost and usage model.  This 
facilitates greater cost efficacies and scale as well as manageable and predictive 
costs. 
 
Cloud Service Delivery Models 
Three archetypal models and the derivative combinations thereof generally 
describe cloud service delivery. According to CSA Security Guidance, 2009 
there are three individual models which are often referred to as the “SPI 
MODEL”, where “SPI” stands for Software, Platform and Infrastructure (as a 
service) respectively. 
 Software as a Service (SaaS): The capability provided to the consumer 
is to use the provider’s applications running on a cloud infrastructure and accessi-
ble from various client devices through a thin client interface such as web brows-
er. In other words, in this model, a complete application is offered to the cus-
tomer as a service on demand. A single instance of the service runs on the cloud 
and multiple end users are services. On the customers’ side, there is no need for 
upfront investment in servers or software licenses, while for the provider, the 
costs are lowered, since only a single application needs to be hosted and main-
tained. In summary, in this model, the customers do not manage or control the 
underlying cloud infrastructure, network, servers, operating systems, storage, or 
even individual application capabilities, with the possible exception of limited us-
er-specific application configuration settings. Currently, SaaS is used for CRM, E-
Mail, Virtual Desktop, communication, games etc. 
 Platform as a Service (PaaS): In this model, a layer of software or de-
velopment environment is encapsulated and offered as a service, upon which oth-
er higher levels of service are built. The customer has the freedom to build his 
own applications, which run on the provider’s infrastructure. Hence, a capability 
is provided to the customer to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure customer-
created applications using programming languages and tools supported by the 
provide. Although the customer does not manage or control the underlying cloud 
infrastructure, network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but he/she has the 
control over the deployed applications and possibly over the application hosting 
environment configurations. To meet manageability and scalability requirements 
of the applications, PaaS providers offer a predefined combination of operating 
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systems, programming languages, database servers etc. 
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): This model provides basic storage 
and computing capabilities as standardized services over the network. Servers, 
storage systems, networking equipment, data center space etc. are pooled and 
made available to handle workloads. The capability provided to the customer is to 
rent processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental computing resources 
where the customer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, which can in-
clude operating systems and applications. The customer does not manage or con-
trol the underlying cloud infrastructure but has the control over operating sys-
tems, storage, deployed applications, and possibly select networking compo-
nents (e.g., firewalls, load balancers etc.).  
To understanding the relationship and dependencies between these models 
describe that IaaS is the foundation of all cloud services with PaaS building up-
on IaaS, and SaaS-in turn –  building upon PaaS.  An architecture of cloud layer 
model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An architecture of the layer model of cloud computing 
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Cloud Service Deployment and Consumption Models 
According to CSA Security Guidance, 2009 the delivery model utilization 
(SaaS, PaaS, IaaS), it has four primary ways in which cloud services are deployed. 
In which Cloud integrators can play a vital role in determining the right cloud 
path for a specific organization. 
 Public cloud: As its name describe that Public clouds are provided by a 
designated service provider and may offer either a single- tenant (dedicated) or 
multi-tenant (shared) operating environment with all the benefits and function-
ality of elasticity and the accountability/utility model of cloud. The physical infra-
structure is generally owned by and managed by the designated service provider 
and located within the provider’s data centers (off- premises). All customers share 
the same infrastructure pool with limited configuration, security protections, and 
availability variances. One of the advantages of a public cloud is that they may be 
larger than an enterprise cloud, and hence they provide the ability to scale seam-
lessly on demand. 
 Private cloud: As its name describe that Private clouds are provided by 
an organization or their designated services and offer a single-tenant (dedicated) 
operating environment with all the benefits and functionality of elasticity and ac-
countability/utility model of cloud. The private clouds aim to address concerns 
on data security and offer greater control, which is typically lacking in a public 
cloud. There are two variants of private clouds: (i) on premise private clouds and 
(ii) externally hosted private clouds. The on premise private clouds, also known as 
internal clouds are hosted within one’s own data center. This model provides a 
more standardized process and protection, but is limited in aspects of size and 
scalability. IT departments would also need to incur the capital and operational 
costs for the physical resources. This is best suited for applications which require 
complete control and configurability of the infrastructure and security. As the 
name implies, the externally hosted private clouds are hosted externally with a 
cloud provider in which the provider 
 Hybrid cloud: As its name describe that Hybrid clouds are a combina-
tion of public and private cloud offerings that allow for transitive information 
exchange and possibly application compatibility and portability across disparate 
cloud service offerings and providers utilizing standard or proprietary methodolo-
gies regardless of ownership or location. With a hybrid cloud, service providers 
can utilize third party cloud providers in a full or partial manner, thereby increas-
ing the flexibility of computing. The hybrid cloud model is capable of providing 
on-demand, externally provisioned scale. The ability to augment a private cloud 
with the resources of a public cloud can be used to manage any unexpected surges 
in workload. 
 Managed cloud: Managed clouds are provided by a designated service 
provider and may offer either a single-tenant (dedicated) or multi-tenant (shared) 
operating environment with all the benefits and functionality of elasticity and the 
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accountability/utility model of cloud. The physical infrastructure is owned by 
and/or physically located in the organizations’ data centers with an extension of 
management and security control planes controlled by the designated service pro-
vider. 
Table 1 
Summary of the various features of cloud deployment models 
Deployment 
Model 
Managed By 
Infrastructure 
Owned By 
Infrastru-
cture 
Located At 
Accessible and 
Consumed By 
Public It is provided 
by third party. 
Third party 
provider 
Off-premise We cannot 
trust. 
Private Provided by 
Organization 
Organization On-premise 
Off-premise 
 
Trusted 
Third party 
provider 
Third party 
provider 
On-premise 
Off-premise 
Managed Third party 
provider 
Third party 
provider 
On-premise It can be 
Trusted or 
Untrusted 
Hybrid Provided by 
organization 
and third party 
Both organiza-
tion 
and third party 
provider 
Both on-
premise 
and off-
premise 
It can be 
Trusted or 
Untrusted 
 
In addition, it is important to understand various tradeoffs between the vari-
ous cloud service models: 
• Generally, SaaS provides a large amount of integrated features built directly 
into the offering with the least amount of extensibility and in general a high level 
of security (or at least a responsibility for security on the part of the service pro-
vider). 
• PaaS offers less integrated features since it is designed to enable devel-
opers to build their own applications on top of the platform, and it is, therefore, 
more extensible than SaaS by nature. However, this extensibility features trade-
offs on security features and capabilities. 
• IaaS provides few, if any, application-like features, and provides for 
enormous extensibility but generally less security capabilities and functionalities 
beyond protecting the infrastructure itself, since it expects operating systems, ap-
plications and contents to be managed and secured by the customers. 
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CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES 
This section addresses the core theme of the above discussed, i.e., the securi-
ty and privacy-related challenges in cloud computing. There are many security 
issues for cloud computing as it encompasses many technologies including net-
works, databases, operating systems, virtualization, resource scheduling, transac-
tion management, load balancing, concurrency control and memory management. 
Therefore, security issues for many of these systems and technologies are applica-
ble to cloud computing. For example, the network that interconnects the systems 
in a cloud has to be secure.  Furthermore, the virtualization paradigm in cloud 
computing leads to several security concerns. For example, mapping the virtual 
machines to the physical machines has to be carried out securely.  Data security 
involves encrypting the data as well as ensuring that appropriate policies are en-
forced for data sharing. Finally, data mining techniques may be applicable for 
malware detection in the clouds – an approach which is usually adopted in intru-
sion detection systems (IDSs) (Sen & Sengupta, 2005; Sen et al., 2006b; Sen et al., 
2008; Sen, 2010a; Sen, 2010b; Sen 2010c). 
According to Trusted Computing Group’s White Paper, 2010 there are six 
specific areas of the cloud computing environment where equipment and software 
require substantial security attention. These six areas are: (1) security of data at 
rest, (2) security of data in transit, (3) authentication of users/applications/ pro-
cesses, (4) robust separation between data belonging to different customers, 
(5) cloud legal and regulatory issues, and (6) incident response. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Areas for security concerns in cloud computing: (1) data at rest, (2) data in transit,  
3) authentication, (4) separation between customers, (5) cloud legal and regulatory issues and  
(6) incident response 
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Threat Vectors- What to Worry About in Security 
The landscape of threats to security and privacy change as organizations shift 
to cloud-based systems, storage and applications, New vectors introduced, and 
old ones can be demoralized in new ways.   
Before categorization of new threats, it is important to acknowledge that the 
structure of many cloud architectures can mitigate or negate some current security 
threats. If data are kept in the cloud, for example, then a lost or stolen laptop is 
much less likely to put sensitive information at risk. According to ENISA, 2009 
Standardized interfaces could make security management easier, while the scale of 
a provider hosting many parties can generate more information for better threat 
monitoring.  Centralized security management and monitoring can be more effec-
tive than local efforts by IT professionals with limited security experience. 
Still, moving critical systems and data to a network-accessible framework in-
troduces new classes of vulnerabilities in and of itself, by creating new surfaces 
to attack and new interfaces to exploit. When those network resources are built 
on systems, platforms and applications shared with others, another set of threat 
vectors is introduced. The control mechanisms itself can be attacked, breaking 
down isolation between users, potentially allowing another user to access data or 
resources. According to Ristenpart et al.2009, even without direct access, a pro-
viders’ other clients can learn valuable transaction data about an organization. 
According to Molnar & Schechter, 2010 the shared architecture also puts a cloud 
user at risk from other cloud users if their bad behavior draws attention from 
either law enforcement or media, leading to hardware seizure or bad publicity. 
Some threat vectors are not new to cloud, but have somewhat differ-
ent dynamics. In classic IT architecture, PCs inside the organization may be at 
risk of compromise through a host of attack vectors exploiting local applications 
such as browses or documents viewers. According to Zetter, 2010 If less data 
is stored locally, less is immediately at risk, but now the attacker could compro-
mise credentials to gain access to the user’s cloud privileges. A compromise to 
an entire Gmail database probably began with a compromised PC. According 
to Lowensohn & McCarthy, 2009 Similarly, in an attack on the Twitter manage-
ment team in 2009, a compromised email password led to exposure of a wide 
range of other important documents in other cloud infrastructures. Shared au-
thentication tokens can lead to brittle defenses. 
Organizations must be careful to safeguard data as they move it 
around their o rganization, even without the benefit of cloud computing. Ac-
cording to Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003 When they no longer need data, it must 
be properly deleted, or else risk leaking sensitive data to the outside. When rely-
ing on a cloud service to handle data, appropriate care must be made to arrange 
for appropriate security management practices, such as encryption and appropri-
ate deletion. 
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Similarly, all organizations are vulnerable to an insider attack from a trusted 
insider, but moving things to the cloud can raise the costs of misplaced trust. 
A cloud system with a well-thought out identity interface and a clear access 
control system can restrict access and foster accountability. However accord-
ing to Sinclair & Smith, 2008, a unified data system with more people accessing 
more different types of data through more applications can actually make it 
harder to appropriately limit access and detect misuse. 
  
Security Issues in Cloud Computing 
Security in the cloud is achieved, in part, through third party controls and as-
surance much like in traditional outsourcing arrangements. But since there is no 
common cloud computing security standard, there are additional challenges asso-
ciated with this. According to CPNI Security Briefing, 2010 many cloud vendors 
implement their own proprietary standards and security technologies, and imple-
ment differing security models, which need to be evaluated on their own merits. 
In a vendor cloud model, it is ultimately down to adopting customer organizations 
to ensure that security in the cloud meets their own security polices through re-
quirements gathering provider risk assessments, due diligence, and assurance activ-
ities. 
Thus, the security challenges faced by organizations wishing to use cloud 
services are not radically different from those dependent on their own in-house 
managed enterprises.  The same internal and external threats are present and 
require risk mitigation or risk acceptance. In the following, we examine the in-
formation security challenges that adopting organizations will need to consider, 
either through assurance activities on the vendor or public cloud providers or 
directly, through designing and implementing security control in a privately owned 
cloud. In particular, we examine the following issues: 
 The treats against information assets residing in cloud computing envi-
ronments. 
 The types of attackers and their capability of attacking the cloud. 
 The security risks associated with the cloud, and where relevant con-
siderations of attacks and countermeasures. 
 Emerging cloud security risks. 
 Some example cloud security incidents. 
 
WORST CLOUD SECURITY THREATS 
According to www.informationweeks.com “Leading cloud security group 
lists the "Notorious Nine" top threats to cloud computing in 2013; most are al-
ready known but defy 100% solution”. 
1. Data Breaches  
According to the CSA report authors "Cloud computing introduces significant 
new avenues of attack”. The data breach at Target, resulting in the loss of personal 
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and credit card information of up to 110 million individuals, was one of a series of 
startling thefts that took place during the normal processing and storage of data. 
The absolute security of hypervisor operation and virtual machine operations is 
still to be proved. Indeed, critics question whether such absolute security can exist. 
The report's writers said there's lab evidence -- though none known in the wild -- 
that breaches via hypervisors and virtual machines may occur eventually. 
2. Data Loss  
A data breach is the result of a malicious and probably intrusive action. Data loss 
may occur when a disk drive dies without its owner having created a backup. It 
occurs when the owner of encrypted data loses the key that unlocks it. Small 
amounts of data were lost for some Amazon Web Service customers as its EC2 
cloud suffered "a remirroring storm" due to human operator error on Easter 
weekend in 2011. And a data loss could occur intentionally in the event of a mali-
cious attack. 
3. Account Or Service Traffic Hijacking  
Account hijacking sounds too elementary to be a concern in the cloud, but CSA 
says it is a problem. Phishing, exploitation of software vulnerabilities such as buff-
er overflow attacks, and loss of passwords and credentials can all lead to the loss 
of control over a user account. An intruder with control over a user account can 
eavesdrop on transactions, manipulate data, provide false and business-damaging 
responses to customers, and redirect customers to a competitor's site or inappro-
priate sites. 
4.  Insecure APIs  
The cloud era has brought about the contradiction of trying to make services 
available to millions while limiting any damage all these largely anonymous users 
might do to the service. The answer has been a public facing application pro-
gramming interface, or API, that defines how a third party connects an application 
to the service and providing verification that the third party producing the applica-
tion is who he says he is. 
5. Denial Of Service (DoS)  
Denial of service attacks are an old disrupter of online operations, but they remain 
a threat nevertheless. The assault by hundreds of thousands or millions of auto-
mated requests for service has to be detected and screened out before it ties up 
operations, but attackers have improvised increasingly sophisticated and distribut-
ed ways of conducting the assault, making it harder to detect which parts of the 
incoming traffic are the bad actors versus legitimate users. 
6. Malicious Insiders  
With the Edward Snowden case and NSA revelations in the headlines, malicious 
insiders might seem to be a common threat. If one exists inside a large cloud or-
ganization, the hazards are magnified. One tactic cloud customers should use to 
protect themselves is to keep their encryption keys on their own premises, not in 
the cloud. 
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7. Abuse Of Cloud Services  
Cloud computing brings large-scale, elastic services to enterprise users and hackers 
alike. "It might take an attacker year to crack an encryption key using his own lim-
ited hardware. But using an array of cloud servers, he might be able to crack it in 
minutes," the report noted. Or hackers might use cloud servers to serve malware, 
launch DDoS attacks, or distribute pirated software. 
8.  Insufficient Due Diligence  
"Too many enterprises jump into the cloud without understanding the full scope 
of the undertaking," said the report. Without an understanding of the service pro-
viders' environment and protections, customers don't know what to expect in the 
way of incident response, encryption use, and security monitoring. Not knowing 
these factors means "organizations are taking on unknown levels of risk in ways 
they may not even comprehend, but that are a far departure from their current 
risks," wrote the authors. 
9.  Shared Technology  
In a multi-tenant environment, the compromise of a single component, such as 
the hypervisor, "exposes more than just the compromised customer; rather, it 
exposes the entire environment to a potential of compromise and breach," the 
report said. The same could be said other shared services, including CPU caches, a 
shared database service, or shared storage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Today, cloud computing is being defined and talked about across the 
ICT industry under different contexts and with different definitions attached to 
it. The core point is that cloud computing means having a server firm that can 
host the services for users connected to it by the network. Technology has moved 
in this direction because of the advancement in computing, communication 
and networking technologies. Fast and reliable connectivity is a must for the ex-
istence of cloud computing. 
Cloud computing is clearly one of the most enticing technology areas of the 
current times due, at least in part to its cost-efficiency and flexibility. However, 
despite the surge in activity and interest, there are significant, persistent con-
cerns about cloud computing that are impeding the momentum and will even-
tually compromise the vision of cloud computing as a new IT procurement mod-
el. Despite the trumpeted business and technical advantages of cloud computing, 
many potential cloud users have yet to join the cloud, and those major corpora-
tions that are cloud users are for the most part putting only their less sensitive 
data in the cloud. Lack of control is transparency in the cloud implementation – 
somewhat contrary to the original promise of cloud computing in which cloud 
implementation is not relevant. Transparency is needed for regulatory reasons and 
to ease concern over the potential for data breaches. Because of today’s perceived 
lack of control, larger companies are testing the waters with smaller projects and 
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less sensitive data. In short, the potential of the cloud is not yet being realized. 
When thinking about solutions to cloud computing’s adoption problem, it is 
important to realize that many of the issues are essentially old problems in a new 
setting, although they may be more acute (Chow et al., 2009). For example, corpo-
rate partnerships and offshore outsourcing involve similar trust and regulatory 
issues. Similarly, open source software enables IT department to quickly build and 
deploy applications, but at the cost of control and governance. Similarly, virtual 
machine attacks and web service vulnerabilities existed long before cloud com-
puting became fashionable. Indeed, this very overlap is reason for optimism; 
many of these cloud computing roadblocks have long been studied and the foun-
dations for solutions exist. For the enhancement of technology, and hence healthy 
growth of global economy, it is extremely important to iron out any issues that 
can cause road-blocks in this new paradigm of computing. 
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